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Abstract—Attack graphs are one of the main techniques used
to automate the risk assessment process. In order to derive a
relevant attack graph, up-to-date information on known attack
techniques should be represented as interaction rules. Designing
and creating new interaction rules is not a trivial task and
currently performed manually by security experts. However, since
the number of new security vulnerabilities and attack techniques
continuously and rapidly grows, there is a need to frequently
update the rule set of attack graph tools with new attack
techniques to ensure that the set of interaction rules is always up-
to-date. We present a novel, end-to-end, automated framework
for modeling new attack techniques from textual description
of a security vulnerability. Given a description of a security
vulnerability, the proposed framework first extracts the relevant
attack entities required to model the attack, completes missing
information on the vulnerability, and derives a new interaction
rule that models the attack; this new rule is integrated within
MulVAL attack graph tool. The proposed framework implements
a novel pipeline that includes a dedicated cybersecurity linguistic
model trained on the the NVD repository, a recurrent neural
network model used for attack entity extraction, a logistic
regression model used for completing the missing information,
and a novel machine learning-based approach for automatically
modeling the attacks as MulVAL’s interaction rule. We evaluated
the performance of each of the individual algorithms, as well as
the complete framework and demonstrated its effectiveness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity risk assessment is an essential activity that
enables system stakeholders to assess the risks to their system
and select suitable countermeasures [24], [35], [44]. A tradi-
tional cybersecurity risk assessment procedure consists of the
following steps: (1) identify system assets, (2) enumerate the
threats to which those assets are exposed, (3) apply network
mapping tools to derive the network topology, (4) apply a
vulnerability scanner to reveal existing security vulnerabilities
in system components, and (5) derive the attack surface of
the system based on the information collected [3]. The attack
surface represents the possible attack paths an attacker can take
to compromise an asset, and thus it can be used to quantify
the overall risk of the system. Based on the attack surface,
an optimal mitigation strategy can be selected to eliminate the
most critical attack paths.
Since modern environments are dynamic and continuously
changing, and new attack techniques are constantly intro-
duced by attackers, the attack surface of such environments
also changes; therefore, risk assessment must be performed
automatically and continuously. The successful implementa-
tion of an automated risk assessment process relies on the
ability to automate the processes of network mapping (using
Nmap [26]), vulnerability discovery (using tools such as Nes-
sus [1] or OpenVAS [10]), penetration testing (using advanced
frameworks such as DeepExploit [46] or Autosploit [32]), and
finally assessment, which includes three main tasks: deriving
the attack surface, quantifying the risk, and identifying the
optimal mitigation strategy that minimizes the risk.
Attack graphs are one of the main techniques used to
perform the assessment process [17]. MulVAL [35], [34] was
the first attack graph tool providing automatic end-to-end
attack graph generation and analysis. Specifically, MulVAL
can be used to derive the attack surface and quantify the risk
of the system; based on the attack surface generated, various
methods can be applied in order to automatically find the
optimal mitigation strategy [43], [41], [42], [22], [21], [13].
Despite recent research and improvements to attack graphs,
there is one major challenge outstanding. In order to derive a
relevant attack graph, up-to-date information on known vulner-
abilities should be available and represented. In attack graph
tools (including MulVAL) the vulnerabilities are represented
using interaction rules (e.g., the preconditions required for an
attacker to execute code on a vulnerable host, the consequence
of the attack) and facts that specify the attacker and system
state (e.g., the attacker’s initial location and goal, host and
network configurations, and existing vulnerabilities).
While facts can be derived automatically using tools such
as Nmap, Nessus, and OpenVAS, designing and creating new
interaction rules is not a trivial task and must be performed
manually by security experts. Because the attack landscape
continuously and rapidly changes with new security vulnera-
bilities and attack techniques (see Figure 1), there is a need
to frequently update the rule set of attack graph tools with
new attack techniques. This research is aimed at developing
an end-to-end, automatic framework for representing new
vulnerabilities in attack graphs (specifically MulVAL), thus
ensuring that the set of interaction rules is always up-to-date.
The development of an automated framework capable of
expanding the set of interaction rules by adding new vulnera-
bilities and attack techniques must address the following three
main challenges:
Automatically analyzing security vulnerabilities. When
modeling a new attack technique, there is a need to specify
both the attack’s preconditions and consequence. An attack’s
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preconditions include the state required by the system for
successful exploitation of the vulnerability (e.g., the vulnerable
application should be running on the system), the context re-
quired for successful exploitation of the vulnerability (e.g., the
attacker must have physical access to the vulnerable system),
and the technique used by the attacker (e.g., the attacker sends
a long message). An attack’s consequence includes the impact
of the attack (e.g., executing code). Although, this information
is part of the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
standard [27] (which defines the basic attributes of publicly
known cybersecurity vulnerabilities), it is often written in free
text; while some of the attributes are structured and can be
analyzed easily without human intervention, critical parts of
the information can appear in natural language within the CVE
description entry, thus making it more difficult to analyze the
data automatically.
Handling partial information. In many cases, only partial
information about the vulnerability is provided [51]; conse-
quently, only partial information about the vulnerability is
considered in the risk assessment procedure.
Formulating the interaction rule. To create an interaction
rule, there is a need to associate the attack entities (extracted
from the description of the security vulnerability) with the
predefined predicates. Since attack entities are written in
free text, the same preconditions/consequences can be appear
in different wording. As a result, mapping the precondi-
tions/consequences to predicates is not a trivial task. After
mapping the preconditions/consequences to its predicates, the
relationships between the predicates should be defined. This is
done by connecting the parameters of the various predicates.
Since the same parameter can be represented differently by
different predicates, connecting the parameters correctly is also
not a trivial task. However, this task is crucial, since it defines
the semantics of the interaction rule.
Previous works in this domain have focused on the first chal-
lenge, i.e., utilizing natural language processing (NLP) tech-
niques to extract attack entities from descriptions of security
vulnerabilities. The vast majority of these methods are based
Figure 1: Vulnerabilities discovered from 1999 to 2020 ac-
cording to the NVD repository.
on supervised machine learning (utilizing hand-crafted fea-
tures) [23], [48], [8], [2], [19] or rule-based approaches [19],
[18], [48], [2]. These methods, however, have several limita-
tions. A supervised machine learning approach cannot utilize
the unlabeled data generally available (e.g., CVE repository).
Rule-based approaches do not consider the semantics of words,
thus providing a very narrow solution that is difficult to
generalize. Although these methods were very popular in the
past, state-of-the-art methods (such as Word2Vec, ELMo, and
BERT) for NLP, which utilize the unlabeled data to construct
a linguistic model, have been shown to be effective for
improving many NLP tasks, including entity extraction [11].
Recent research utilized linguistic models for extracting attack
entities [25], [40], [20], [15]. These methods, however, are
solely based on pretrained linguistic models, without any fine-
tuning. Since the cybersecurity domain, and more specifically,
attack descriptions, include specific terminology and linguistic
semantics, the pretrained models available (which were trained
on a generic corpus of data, such as English Wikipedia [53])
are less suitable.
In this paper, we present a novel, end-to-end, automated
framework for modeling new attack techniques and integrating
them into the risk assessment process. Given a description of
a security vulnerability, the proposed framework (i) extracts
the relevant attack entities required to model the attack, (ii)
completes missing information on the vulnerability, (iii) asso-
ciates the attack entities to the predefined predicates, and (iv)
defines the relationships between those predicates, resulting in
a new interaction rule that models the new attack technique.
Within this framework, we implemented a novel pipeline
that includes the following machine learning models which
interact with one another: 1) a dedicated cybersecurity lin-
guistic model trained on 5.8M words from 146K vulnerability
descriptions (from the NVD repository); 2) a recurrent neural
network (BLSTM) which is used for attack entity extraction
– this network was trained on a unique dataset, created by
us, of 20K labeled words from 650 vulnerability descrip-
tions; 3) a dedicated clustering models used for associating
the attack entities to the predefined predicates; 4) a logistic
regression model used for completing the missing information
– this model was trained on 40K vulnerability descriptions
(which exist in the NVD repository); and 5) an imputation
model based on the k-nearest neighbors used to define the
relationships between the predicates – this model was trained
on 200 rules that exist in MulVAL’s default interaction rule
file. We evaluated the proposed framework (which is based
on a linguistic model trained on cybersecurity related content)
and compared it with previous methods used for attack entity
extraction. The results show that the proposed method signif-
icantly outperforms existing methods [23], [48].
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• An end-to-end framework for automatically modeling
new attack techniques and integrating them into the risk
assessment process.
• A dedicated cybersecurity linguistic model trained on
5.8M words from 146K vulnerability descriptions (from
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the NVD repository); this model can be used for any
downstream NLP task in the cybersecurity domain.
• An entity recognition model that can be used to extract
attack entities from security vulnerabilities. This model
is available as an online service for the security research
community.1
• A labeled dataset of 20K labeled words (entities) from
650 vulnerability descriptions, which, to the best of our
knowledge, is currently the largest dataset available.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The proposed framework consists of four main phases which
are presented in Figure 11 (in the Appendix): (1) derive a
cybersecurity linguistic model, (2) extract attack entities, (3)
complete the missing information, and (4) generate MulVAL
interaction rules. In this section, we provide an overview of the
phases and demonstrate the entire process using an example.
Phase 1. Derive a Cybersecurity Linguistic Model. In
this phase, we utilize word embedding techniques (such as
Word2Vec, ELMo, and BERT) in order to derive a language
model for cybersecurity-related content. The input for this
phase is a repository of unstructured/semi-structured reports of
cyberattacks – in this research we used the NVD. The output
of this phase is a linguistic model. Given a word or sentence
written in free text, the linguistic model provides a numerical
representation (vector) that preserves the semantic relations
between words.
Phase 2. Extract Attack Entities. In this phase, given a
textual (structured or semi-structured) description of a vul-
nerability, we extract entities that are necessary for modeling
the attack. Examples of such entities are the attack vector, the
means required by an attacker to exploit the vulnerability, the
attack technique, the impact of the attack, the vulnerable plat-
form, etc. The extraction of attack entities is performed in two
steps. First, the cybersecurity linguistic model derived in the
previous phase is used to generate a numerical representation
for the textual description of a vulnerability (i.e., the upstream
task). Second, given the numerical representation, a dedicated
model (based on a bidirectional LSTM neural network) is used
to extract attack entities (i.e., the downstream task).
Phase 3. Complete Missing Information. In this phase, we
utilize machine learning techniques to predict missing entities,
based on similar attack reports. The input for this phase is the
list of entities extracted in the previous phase and the list of
entities that are missing. The output of this phase consists of
the predicted values for the missing entities.
Phase 4. Generate MulVAL Interaction Rules. In this phase,
given the knowledge extracted about the attack, we generate
the MulVAL’s interaction rules. This is done by utilizing
machine learning techniques. The inputs for this phase are:
(1) the list of entities and the values extracted from the
attack description, and (2) the completed values derived in
1The link was removed to maintain the anonymity of the authors.
the previous phase. The output of this phase is the MulVAL
interaction rule that models the attack.
Example 1. A concrete example for the four main phases of
the proposed framework is presented in Figure 2. The input
is a free text description of a security vulnerability in Adobe
Reader that appears in the NVD (CVE-2010-2212). First, we
utilized the cybersecurity linguistic model to generate a numer-
ical representation for each word in the description (Phase 1).
Those vectors are the input to the attack entity extraction
algorithm, which extracts the entities that are necessary for
modeling the attack (Phase 2). As can be seen, the algorithm
identifies six different entities: the means used by the attacker
to exploit the vulnerability (buffer overflow); the vulnerable
platform (Adobe Reader); the vulnerable versions (9.0.0-9.3.3
and 8.0.0-8.2.3); the vulnerable operating systems (Windows
and Mac OS X); the impact of the attack (execute arbitrary
code or cause denial of service); and the attack technique (PDF
file containing Flash content with a crafted tag).
Once the attack entities are extracted, we identify and
complete the missing entities (Phase 3). In this example, the
attack vector, which is an extremely important property of the
attack, is not mentioned within the description. The proposed
method was able to complete this missing value and identified
that the vulnerability can be exploited remotely (i.e., remote
attack vector).
Finally, given the attack entities, the proposed method
generates a MulVAL interaction rule that models the attack
(Phase 4). As can be observed, this rule consists of the follow-
ing five preconditions: a target host (denoted as Host) running
an Adobe Reader application (version 9.0.0-9.3.3 or 8.0.0-
8.2.3 on Windows or Mac OS X); a host controlled by the
attacker (denoted as AttackerHost); a remotely exploitable
vulnerability in Adobe Reader (in the specified versions),
which leads to a privilege escalation; and a network access
from the attacker host to the target host. Satisfying these
preconditions allows the attacker to execute code on the target
machine by exploiting the vulnerability. We will elaborate on
each of the phases in next sections.
III. CYBERSECURITY LINGUISTIC MODEL
Linguistic models have been shown to be effective for
improving many NLP tasks [11], [37], [30]. These include
generic tasks, such as question answering, named entity recog-
nition, and sentiment analysis, as well as content-specific tasks,
such as attack entity extraction from cybersecurity reports [25],
[40], [20], [15]. The main advantages of linguistic models over
traditional approaches are threefold: First, linguistic models
decouple the upstream task (i.e., learning general language
representation) from the downstream tasks (e.g., sentiment
analysis), thus enabling the linguistic model to be reused in
different applications. Second, linguistic models can utilize
unlabeled data, which is widely available. Third, linguistic
models preserve the semantics of words. For example, words
with a similar meaning or words that appear in similar contexts
will be close to each other within the latent representation.
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Figure 2: The process of generating MulVAL’s interaction rule, given a description of security vulnerability.
When applying linguistic models in a new domain, two
alternatives can be considered: (1) training a domain-specific
linguistic model from scratch, or (2) utilizing an existing lin-
guistic model (such as BERT [11], GloVe [36], or ELMo [37]),
which was already trained on a large corpus of data from
another domain. When using a pretrained model, the model
can be applied without any changes or by fine-tuning the
model with domain-specific data. Intuitively, when a large
corpus of domain-specific data is unavailable or when compu-
tational power is limited, training a model from scratch cannot
be considered. On the other hand, when the target domain
has specific terminology and linguistic semantics, pretrained
models often don’t perform well.
Recent research on attack entity extraction have been based
solely on pretrained linguistic models, without any fine-
tuning [25], [40], [20], [15]. Since the cybersecurity domain,
and more specifically, attack descriptions include specific ter-
minology and linguistic semantics, we believe that a linguistic
model specifically trained on cybersecurity related content will
outperform the pretrained models available (which are trained
on a generic corpus of data, such as English Wikipedia [53]).
For this reason, we opted to develop a dedicated cybersecurity
linguistic model.
A. Dataset
The dataset used to create our cybersecurity linguistic model
consists of 146K vulnerability descriptions from the NVD
(253K sentences and 5.8M words in total). In order to support
our decision for creating of a new linguistic model for cyber-
security, we compared frequently occurring words in the NVD
dataset with frequently occurring words in Wikipedia (T-REx
dataset [12]). Specifically, we extracted the most frequently
occurring words (after removing stop words) from the NVD
and Wikipedia (the top 100 from each dataset) and explored
their distribution. The results are presented in Figure 3. The
top two graphs present the frequency of the 100 most frequent
words in the NVD dataset, where graph (a) presents the words’
distribution within the NVD dataset, and graph (b) presents
their distribution within the Wikipedia dataset. Similarly, the
graphs below present the frequency of the 100 most frequent
words in the Wikipedia dataset, where graph (c) presents the
words’ distribution within the NVD dataset and graph (d)
presents their distribution within the Wikipedia dataset. As
can be seen, the distributions are quite different – frequently
occurring words in the NVD dataset are not so frequent in
the Wikipedia dataset and vice versa. For example, while the
most common words in the Wikipedia dataset are: also, one,
first, used, may, known, many, two, world, and united, the most
common words in the NVD dataset are: via, allows, remote,
attackers, vulnerability, arbitrary, execute, service, code, and
cause. This observation supports our main assumption that the
cybersecurity domain has specific terminology and linguistic
semantics, and therefore a linguistic model that is specifically
trained on cybersecurity related content will outperform the
pretrained models available, which are trained on a generic
corpus of data, such as English Wikipedia.
B. Word embedding algorithm
State-of-the art algorithms for creating linguistic models
include millions of parameters. In contrast to fine-tuning a
pretrained model, training a linguistic model from scratch
requires a large corpus of data. For example, the language
representation model, BERT [11], consists of 340M trainable
parameters and was trained on a very large corpus of 3B
words. In contrast, our dataset, which is based on vulnerability
descriptions present in the NVD, consists of 5.8M words. Fur-
thermore, the computational power required to train models,
such as BERT, is extremely high. The BERT training was
performed on 64 TPU chips for a period of four days [11].
The estimated cost for this training (based on Google Cloud’s
price per hour for on-demand TPU v3) is about $50K. Hence,
for our purposes, training complex and deep models like BERT
form scratch cannot be considered, and therefore we opted to
use a lightweight model.
The proposed linguistic model was created using Word2Vec,
a lightweight language representation algorithm [30]. In con-
trast to deep neural network architecture, such as BERT [11]
and ELMo [37], Word2Vec utilizes a shallow neural network
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Figure 3: Presenting the distributions of the most frequently
occurring words from the NVD and Wikipedia dataset.
with only one hidden layer, thus dramatically reducing the
number of trainable parameters, which directly affects the
amount of data and computational power required to train a
model.
Specifically, we tested two popular variants of Word2Vec:
continuous bag-of-words (CBOW) [30] and skip-gram
(SG) [30]. The main difference between the two variants is that
in CBOW the model tries to predict the current word given its
surrounding contextual words, while in SG the model tries to
predict the context (surroundings words) of a given word [30].
Network architecture. In our implementation, the network
architecture of the two models (CBOW and SG) is very
similar: we set the vocabulary size to 10K words (which covers
93% of the text in the NVD dataset), the window size to five
words, and the embedding dimension size to 100 neurons. As
a result, the architectures of the models consist of a shallow
neural network with three layers: an input layer with a size
of 10K inputs (in one-hot vector encoding), a dense hidden
layer with 100 neurons, and a softmax output layer with a
size of 10K. There are 2M trainable parameters, which is much
smaller than deep neural network architectures.
Optimization. We trained the models using backpropaga-
tion [38] for 300 epochs and stochastic gradient descent [45],
where the learning rate was set at 0.0001.
C. Evaluation
Experimental setup. In order to evaluate the proposed cyber-
security linguistic models, we compared the Word2Vec models
with state-of-the-art pretrained ELMo and BERT models. For
each model we tested the following two setups: using the
pretrained model without any fine-tuning and using the pre-
trained model with fine-tuning. The fine-tuning was performed
by continuing the training of the pretrained models (for 100
epochs), using the dataset of attack descriptions from the NVD
(as presented in Section III-A). All of the experiments were
performed on a single GPU of NVIDIA GeForce Titan X
Pascal with 12GB.
Evaluation measures. The comparison was performed based
on the three common approaches for evaluating linguistic
models: word semantic similarity, concept categorization, and
downstream task performance [4], [37], [11].
• Word semantic similarity. This method is based on the
rationale that the distance between words in the embedding
space should reflect the semantic distance between these
words. In order to evaluate the semantic similarity of words,
we selected a list of words from the cybersecurity domain
and let the different linguistic models find the words closest
to these words in the embedding space.
• Concept categorization. This method evaluates the clusters
within the word embedding space. The rationale for using
clustering is based on the assumption that words belonging
to the same category will be close to each other within the
embedding space. We evaluate the clusters with respect to
categories from the cybersecurity domain. Specifically, we
used attack entities, such as the attack vector, attack tech-
nique, mean, impact, and operating system, as categories.
• Downstream task performance. This method evaluates the
performance of the different linguistic models in the down-
stream task. The rationale is that a better linguistic model
will produce a better feature vector for the supervised
machine learning algorithm, which will result in better
performance in the downstream task. In our context, the
downstream task is attack entity recognition, which extracts
the relevant entities of the attack from a given text that
describes the attack. In this evaluation, we tested the perfor-
mance of the attack entity extraction algorithm when using
different cybersecurity linguistic models.
Results. We present the results with respect to the first two
evaluation measures, namely: word semantic similarity and
concept categorization. The results for the third evaluation
measure i.e., the performance in the downstream task, are
presented in Section IV.
• Word semantic similarity. The results are presented in Fig-
ure 4. The words that we chose for this evaluation are:
buffer, privilege, kernel, and windows. As can be seen,
the fact that the ELMo model used character embedding,
influences the neighbors of each word, even if the meaning
of the words is different. In the BERT model, we can see
that the dataset used for pretraining affects the neighbors;
for example, the neighborhood of windows consists of the
words doors, rooms, and window which do not exist in
the cybersecurity domain. In the graphs that describe the
CBOW and SG models, we can see that all of the neighbors
of each word have the same security-related meaning (and
even the same entity).
5
 R Y H U I O R Z L Q W H J H U
 X Q G H U I O R Z
 E X I I H U
 O L Q X [
 [  
 L R F W O
 N H U Q H O
 [ S
 Y L V W D
 U 
 Z L Q G R Z V
 H O H Y D W L R Q
 H V F D O D W L R Q G L V F O R V X U H
 S U L Y L O H J H
 :  9    & % 2 :
 R Y H U I O R Z
 L Q W H J H U
 X Q G H U I O R Z
 E X I I H U
 O L Q X [ [  
 L R F W O
 N H U Q H O
 [ S
 Y L V W D
 U 
 Z L Q G R Z V
 H O H Y D W L R Q H V F D O D W L R Q
 G L V F O R V X U H S U L Y L O H J H
 :  9    6 N L S  * U D P
 E X I I H U
 E D U H E R Q H V
 E L R J U D S K L F D O
 E D N D V V L
 Z L Q G R Z V
 Z U H D N V
 Z L Q G M D P P H U Z D W K D X U R Q J
 N H U Q H O
 N U D N D W R D
 N H V W U H O N H P H U R Y R
 S U L Y L O H J H
 S K \ O R J H Q H W L F
 S U R [ H P L F V D U W D N H
 ( / 0 R  ) L Q H  W X Q H G
 Z L Q G R Z V Z L Q G R Z
 G R R U V
 U R R P V
 S U L Y L O H J H
 S U L Y L O H J H V S U L Y L O H J H G
 Z R Q G H U I X O
 N H U Q H O
 F R P S R Q H Q W V
 I D F L O L W D W H V
 E X I I H U
 S U R W H F W L Q J
 L Q K L E L W
 G H F U H D V H G
 % ( 5 7  ) L Q H  W X Q H G
 E X I I H U
 E D U H E R Q H V
 E L R J U D S K L F D O
 E D N D V V L
 Z L Q G R Z V
 Z U H D N V Z L Q G M D P P H U
 Z D W K D X U R Q J
 N H U Q H O
 N U D N D W R D
 N H V W U H O N H P H U R Y R
 S U L Y L O H J H S K \ O R J H Q H W L F
 S U R [ H P L F V
 D U W D N H
 ( / 0 R
 Z L Q G R Z V Z L Q G R Z
 G R R U V
 U R R P V
 S U L Y L O H J H S U L Y L O H J H V S U L Y L O H J H G
 Z R Q G H U I X O
 N H U Q H O
 F R P S R Q H Q W V
 I D F L O L W D W H V  E X I I H U
 S U R W H F W L Q J
 L Q K L E L W
 G H F U H D V H G
 % ( 5 7
Figure 4: A visualization (using T-SNE) of the word embed-
ding space of each linguistic model for selected words from
the cybersecurity domain and their closest neighbours in the
embedding space. Each color in the graphs indicates a cluster
of closest words in the embedding space.
• Concept categorization. The results are presented in Fig-
ure 5. Each sub-figure visualizes the word embedding space
of the different linguistic models (we used the T-SNE
algorithm for dimensional reduction). As can be seen, the
word embedding space of the pretrained BERT and ELMo
models does not show clear clusters. Similar results were
observed for the fine-tuned BERT and ELMo models. In
contrast, the word embedding space of the proposed models
(which were trained from scratch on cybersecurity related
content) contains clear clusters that represent the different
attack entities.
IV. ATTACK ENTITY EXTRACTION
Entity extraction, or named entity recognition (NER), is
a common NLP task [39]. The main objective of this task
is to classify unstructured text (written in natural language)
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Figure 5: A visualization (using T-SNE) of the embedding
space for each linguistic model, for words from the NVD cor-
pus. Each color in the graphs indicates a different attack entity.
into predefined categories. Formally, given a sequence of
words S = (w1, ..., wnw) and predefined categories C =
(c1, ..., cnc), the output is essentially a sequence of categories
(tags) T = (t1, ..., tnw |ti ∈ C) that maps each word to each
category.
Entity extraction has been researched for more than two
decades. Early methods were based on handcrafted rules,
lexicons, orthographic features, and ontologies [50]. These
methods were followed by supervised learning algorithms,
such as the hidden Markov model [6], [52], maximum entropy
models [7], [9], the support vector machine [29], and condi-
tional random fields [28]. Although these methods were very
popular in the past, they have two main limitations. First, these
methods are based on manual feature engineering, which does
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not utilize the unlabeled data that is most available. Second,
these methods can only process a single data point and not
entire sequences. Therefore, they cannot be used to learn long-
term dependencies.
Recent advances in NER utilize linguistic models for au-
tomatic feature extraction and recurrent neural networks (in
particular, a special type of RNN termed the bidirectional long
short-term memory network [5]) for the entity extraction task
[50]. Based on recent advances in NER, we developed a dedi-
cated attack entity extraction algorithm. This algorithm utilizes
the cybersecurity linguistic model (described in Section III),
as well as a dedicated BLSTM neural network architecture, to
extract multiple attack entities.
A. Attack entities
In this work, we consider the following attack entities:
Platform. Security vulnerabilities are usually associated with
a specific product. This attack entity is used to identify product
names. In this study, we consider two types of products:
software products (e.g., Adobe Reader) and hardware products
(e.g., Cisco Gateway).
Version. Security vulnerabilities are often bound to some
specific versions of a product. This attack entity is used to
identify specific product versions (e.g., 9.x before 9.3.3 and
8.x before 8.2.3).
Operating system. In some cases, vulnerability exploitation
is bound to a specific operating system. This attack entity is
used to identify the names of operating systems (e.g., Windows
or Linux).
Network protocol. In some cases, security vulnerabilities
exist within network protocols or can be exploited through
network protocols. This attack entity is used to identify
network protocols (e.g., Telnet).
Network port. In cases in which the vulnerability is bound to
a network protocol, the default port is usually mentioned. This
attack entity is used to identify the network port (e.g., 23).
Attack means. This attack entity is used to identify the
specific weakness exploited by the attacker (e.g., cross-site
scripting, buffer overflow).
Attach technique. This attack entity is used to identify the
specific technique used by the attacker to exploit the vulnera-
bility (e.g., sending a crafted HTTP request).
Attack impact. This attack entity is used to identify the
specific consequences of executing the attack (e.g., execute
code, denial of service, privilege escalation).
Privilege. This attack entity is used to identify the privilege
required by the attacker to exploit the vulnerability or the priv-
ilege granted to the attacker after exploiting the vulnerability
(e.g., user privilege, root privilege).
Attack vector. This attack entity is used to identify the
context required for successful exploitation of the vulnerability
(e.g., the attack requires the attacker to have physical access
to the vulnerable system).
B. Dataset
Because a large dataset of security vulnerabilities with
labeled attack entities described above wasn’t availble at the
time of this research, we created a labeled dataset consisting of
650 vulnerability descriptions from the NVD (800 sentences
and 20K words in total). The labeling was performed by 245
computer science students during an academic cybersecurity
course, with each vulnerability labeled by at least two students.
We validated the labeling by comparing the labels assigned by
the students; in cases in which there was a discrepancy, we
selected the correct label.
Descriptive statistics about the dataset are presented in
Figure 6. As can be seen, the dataset is imbalanced, since
a large portion of the words (about 30%) do not match any
entity. In addition, some entities are less common (such as
privilege, protocol, and port).
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Figure 6: Histogram of the data entities.
C. Attack entity extraction algorithm
Network architecture. The input to the attack entity extrac-
tion algorithm is a sequence of words, which are represented
using the cybersecurity linguistic model (described in Sec-
tion III. The output for each word is a distribution of the
attack entities. The architecture of the proposed neural network
is presented in Figure 7. The network includes the following
layers: an input layer with N neurons, each of which has
D inputs, where N represents an upper bound for the length
of a sentence, and D represents the embedding dimension;
a forward and backward LSTM layer, each of which has
N LSTM units; N dense layers with O neurons, each of
which has 2D inputs, where O represents the number of attack
entities; and N softmax output layers.
Optimization. We trained the models using backpropagation
through time [49], [16] for 100 epochs (and a batch size of
32), using stochastic gradient descent [45], where the learning
rate was set at 0.01. In addition, to cope with the imbalanced
dataset, we used the following weighted cross-entropy loss
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Figure 7: The proposed entity extraction algorithm.
function.
L = −
∑
i
wiyi log(pi) wi =
{
10, if i ≤ 10
1, otherwise
(1)
where the first 10 classes are the attack entities, and the last
class is the ‘none’ entity.
D. Evaluation
Experimental setup. We tested the proposed NER architec-
ture with the different linguistic models described in Sec-
tion III. Specifically, we trained a different NER model for
each of the following linguistic models: Word2Vec models
(CBOW and SG), pretrained ELMo and BERT models, and
fine-tuned ELMo and BERT models. Since the dimension of
the embedding space is different for the various linguistic
models examined, we set the D parameter of the NER model
in accordance with that dimension, i.e., for the Word2Vec, D
was set to 100; for the ELMo models, D was set to 1024;
and for the BERT models, D was set to 768. In addition,
we compared the proposed NER model architecture to the
architecture used in previous studies specifically focused on
attack entity extraction. These works were based on supervised
machine learning algorithms (such as the conditional random
field algorithm) [23], [48] and rule-based systems [48]. In
order to evaluate the models, we used 5-fold cross-validation
(such that each fold includes 130 randomly selected CVEs).
All of the experiments were performed on a single GPU of
NVIDIA GeForce Titan X Pascal with 12GB.
Evaluation measures. We used the F-score (F-measure) [47],
which is the harmonic mean of the precision and the recall, as
a measure for the accuracy of the models. Since we are dealing
with a multiclass classification problem, we used a one versus
all setup to calculate F-scores for specific attack entities and
the micro/macro average for the average performance.
Results. Several interesting observations can be made regard-
ing the results which are presented in Table I. First, the
proposed NER model yields superior results when using the
cybersecurity linguistic model trained from scratch using the
Word2Vec (CBOW) algorithm. Second, when using pretrained
linguistic models (such as ELMo and BERT) without any fine-
tuning, the NER model’s results are inferior to the results of
the supervised conditional random field algorithm, which does
not utilize unlabeled data. These two observations support
our main hypothesis that cybersecurity semantics are quite
different than the semantics of the common English language.
We also note that there is a significant difference between the
macro-average F-score of the NER model that is based on the
cybersecurity linguistic model trained from scratch using the
Word2Vec (CBOW) algorithm and the NER models that are
based on fine-tuned ELMo/BERT models. This observation
indicates that NER models based on fine-tuned linguistic
models are less sensitive to the minority classes.
V. COMPLETE MISSING INFORMATION
The output of the attack entity extraction algorithm occa-
sionally misses valuable information about the attack; this
is due to the following reasons: In some cases, the vul-
nerability description itself is incomplete. For example, the
description presented in Figure 2 does not include information
regarding the context required by the attacker for successful
exploitation of the vulnerability (i.e., attack vector). In other
cases, although the vulnerability description includes all of
the information about the attack, the attack entity extraction
model fails to identify the attack entity. In both cases, this
information, which is relevant for modeling the attack, can
often be completed (predicted) based on similar, previously
labeled, vulnerabilities.
Formally, we define the problem of completing the missing
information as follows: Let ci be a security vulnerability
description, E∗ci be the ground truth labels (entities) of ci,
and Eci ⊂ E∗ci be the subset of entities that are identified by
the attack entity extraction algorithm. The task of completing
the missing information of ci is predicting Eˆci = E
∗
ci \ Eci .
We propose an algorithm for predicting the attack entities
that are missing. The proposed method utilizes the set of
entities that are identified by the attack entity extraction
algorithm Eci to predict Eˆci . We specifically focus on the
following three attack entities: attack vector, attack impact,
and attack means, which are important for modeling an attack.
A. Dataset
The dataset is based on the unlabeled dataset used to create
the cybersecurity linguistic model. As presented in Section III,
this dataset consists of 146K vulnerability descriptions from
the NVD. We applied the attack entity extraction model (when
using the Word2Vec-CBOW cybersecurity linguistic model) on
the 146K vulnerability descriptions from the NVD and filter
vulnerabilities with less than four attack entities and vulnera-
bilities that do not include the three attack entities described
above (i.e., attack vector, attack impact, and attack means).
The filtered dataset includes 40K vulnerability descriptions;
we randomly selected 30K vulnerability descriptions as the
training set, and the reminder served as the test set.
B. Complete missing information algorithm
Feature representation. The process of creating the feature
vector for a vulnerability description includes the following
three phases:
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Attack
Vector
Attack
Technique
Attack
Impact
Attack
Mean
Vulnerable
Platform
Vulnerable
OS
Vulnerable
Version
Network
Protocol
Network
Port
Micro
Average
Macro
Average
CRF [23] 0.86 0.19 0.49 0.33 0.42 0.35 0.43 0.68 0.95 0.43 0.52
CRF [48] 0.93 0.60 0.78 0.55 0.72 0.66 0.81 0.66 0.94 0.77 0.73
Rule-based [48] - 0.50 0.59 0.33 0.47 - 0.49 - - 0.47 0.46
ELMo (pretrained) 0.86 0.75 0.82 0.64 0.68 0.59 0.78 0.30 0.73 0.74 0.68
BERT (pretrained) 0.79 0.61 0.73 0.58 0.62 0.42 0.68 0.30 0.35 0.63 0.56
ELMo (fine-tuned) 0.93 0.85 0.88 0.72 0.77 0.61 0.86 0.35 0.83 0.81 0.75
BERT (fine-tuned) 0.92 0.78 0.86 0.72 0.73 0.66 0.78 0.59 0.40 0.80 0.71
Word2Vec (Skip-Gram) 0.94 0.87 0.89 0.74 0.76 0.72 0.72 0.43 0.80 0.80 0.76
Word2Vec (CBOW) 0.94 0.89 0.90 0.78 0.76 0.75 0.80 0.65 0.94 0.83 0.82
Word2Vec + CMI
(CBOW + k-NN) 0.95 0.89 0.92 0.80 0.76 0.75 0.80 0.65 0.94 0.83 0.82
Word2Vec + CMI
(CBOW + LR) 0.96 0.89 0.93 0.82 0.76 0.75 0.80 0.65 0.94 0.84 0.83
Table I: Performance comparison (F1-scores) of the different models in attack entity extraction task.
• Extract. The feature vector used for predicting the missing
information is based on the set of known entities (denoted
by Eci ). Specifically, we apply the attack entity extraction
model (when using the Word2Vec-CBOW cybersecurity
linguistic model) to extract the attack entities from the
vulnerability description. The output of this phase is a list
of attack entities and their corresponding values (words),
which are written in free text.
• Transform. In this phase, we transform the free text values
of each attack entity into numerical vectors. This is done by
using the Word2Vec-CBOW cybersecurity linguistic model.
The output of this phase is the embedding representation
for every value (word) in any attack entity. Please note that
the number of values in each attack entity is not the same
for each vulnerability. Therefore, the values of each attack
entity are represented using a different number of vectors
(each of which is the size of the embedding dimension D).
• Aggregate. In this phase, we aggregate the vectors that
represent the values of each attack entity into a single vector.
We refer to this vector as the succinct vector (SV). The SV
is calculated based on the following equation:
SV (v1, . . . , vk) =
∑k
i=1
vi
‖vi‖
k
(2)
The output of this phase consists of the SVs for each attack
entity.
The concatenation of the SVs is the feature vector used by
the complete missing information algorithm. The feature
vector includes 900 features (i.e., 100 features for each attack
entity). In a case in which the attack entity has no value, the
corresponding features are equal to zero.
Algorithm. The proposed approach for completing the miss-
ing information is based on k-means clustering for class
discretization and logistic regression for prediction.
• Class Discretization. The task of completing the missing
information for a security vulnerability is essentially pre-
dicting the specific values of the missing attack entities.
Since attack entities are written in free text, the same
sentence can be written in various ways. For instance,
the following phrases: ‘execute arbitrary code,’ ‘code ex-
ecution,’ ‘code exec,’ and ‘running code’ have the same
meaning and therefore should be treated similarly. However,
their representations (using the SV) are slightly different. In
addition, training an algorithm on a 100-dimensional output
space is difficult. To mitigate this problem, we use the
k-means clustering algorithm to cluster the output values
into groups having the same meaning. The results of this
clustering for the tree attack entity (namely, attack vector,
attack impact, and attack means) are presented in Figure 8.
As can be seen, each attack entity has very clear clusters. We
labeled the clusters manually by analyzing several samples
from each cluster. This labeling was performed based on
MulVAL’s existing primitives.
• Prediction. The prediction model is based on the logistic re-
gression algorithm. This algorithm measures the relationship
between the categorical dependent variable (i.e., the cluster
number) and the independent variables (feature vector) by
estimating coefficients wk using the following multinominal
logistic function.
f(X) = argmax
k
ewkX+bk∑K
j=1 e
wkX+bk
(3)
where k is the cluster number, X is the feature vector, and
wk, bk are the model coefficients and bias respectively.
Optimization. We trained the model using the limited mem-
ory BFGS optimization algorithm and cross-entropy loss for
70 iterations. During the training we use l2 regularization.
C. Evaluation
Experimental setup. We tested the proposed algorithm and
compared it to a simple k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) algorithm
without class discretization, which served as the baseline. In
the k-NN model, the instance was classified based on the
values of the attack entity of its nearest neighbor. We trained
three logistic regression models and three k-NN models to
predict the missing values for each of the three attack entities.
The models were trained on the dataset described above, which
includes 30K vulnerability descriptions from the NVD and
tested on the remaining 10K vulnerability descriptions. In
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Figure 8: The clusters of each entity that we predict.
order to train the model, we simulated the existence of missing
entities by removing the SVs that represent the label (from the
feature vector). This trick, known as masking, is very common
when labeled data is not available. All of the experiments were
performed on a 64-bit Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise
machine, with a 2.00 GHZ Intel Xeon CPU (version E5-2620
with 24 logical cores) and 64 GB of RAM. The algorithms
were implemented in Python using the sklearn library.
Evaluation measures. In order to evaluate the model, we
defined the following three evaluation measures:
• Performance on masked attack entities - evaluates the
performance of the two algorithms in predicting the masked
values. We used the recall and precision at k as measures for
the accuracy of the models, where k denotes the number of
values recommended by the model. These metrics are very
common in the field of recommendation systems.
• Performance on attack entity extraction - evaluates the
performance of the two algorithms in improving the attack
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Figure 9: Performance comparison (recall and precision at k)
of the two algorithms in the task of completing the missing
information (evaluation on masked attack entities).
entity extraction algorithm. Specifically, we tested whether
the two algorithms can reduce the number of false negatives
of the attack entity extraction algorithm. Similar to Sec-
tion IV, we used the F-score as a measure for the accuracy.
Results. In this section, we present the results with respect to
the two evaluation measures.
• Performance on masked attack entities. The results, which
are presented in Figure 9, are very promising. Specifically,
the logistic regression model outperforms the k-NN model
for all three attack entities.
• Performance on attack entity extraction. The results are
presented in Figure 9. As can be seen, the process of
completing the missing information improves the perfor-
mance of the Word2Vec (CBOW) model in attack entity
extraction. Specifically, when using the logistic regression
model for completing the missing information, the average
performance improves by 1%.
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VI. GENERATE MULVAL INTERACTION RULES
In this section, we present the process of automatically
generating MulVAL’s interaction rules, given the entities ex-
tracted for a security vulnerability (phase 4 in Figure 2). We
begin by providing an introduction to the MulVAL framework.
Then, we present the process of automatically generating the
interaction rules. Finally, we present an end-to-end evaluation
for the entire process of generating MulVAL’s interaction rules,
given a description of a security vulnerability.
A. Introduction to logical attack graphs and MulVAL
Logical attack graphs. A logical attack graph is defined as
a tuple AG = (Nr, Np, Nd, E,L,G), where:
• Nr is the set of derivation nodes that correspond to rules
and represent the logic for a fact to become true (visualized
as circles); these nodes imply an AND relation between their
incoming nodes;
• Np is the set of primitive facts that correspond to the inputs
describing the specific system (visualized as rectangles);
• Nd is the set of derived facts that are the results of applying
rules on the primitive facts (visualized as diamonds); these
nodes imply an OR relation between their incoming nodes;
• E ⊆ {(Np ∪ Nd) × Nr} ∪ {Nr × Nd} is the set of edges
(i.e., an edge can connect a primitive or derived fact with a
derivation node or a derivation node with a derived fact);
• L is a mapping between nodes and their labels; and
• G is the node that represents the attacker’s goal.
Note that the incoming nodes to a derivation node represent the
preconditions for performing the corresponding actions, while
the incoming nodes to a derived node represent the various
paths that lead to the same consequence.
The MulVAL framework. MulVAL [35] is a logic-based
network security analyzer, which provides automated attack
graph generation and analysis. The modeling language used
by MulVAL is Datalog [35], which is a subset of the Prolog
logic programming language. The Datalog language consists
of facts and rules, which are defined using predicates.
A predicate is an atomic formula of the form: p(t1, ..., tk),
where each argument ti can be either a constant (starting with
a lowercase letter) or a variable (starting with an uppercase
letter). For instance, the following predicate states that some
vulnerability is present in the oracleDB program running on
dbServer: vulExists(dbServer, V ulID, oracleDB).
Rules (referred to as interaction rules in MulVAL) are repre-
sented using Horn clauses as follows: P0 : −P1, ..., Pn, which
essentially indicates that if the predicates P1, ..., Pn are true,
then predicate P0 is also true. The left part of the clause (P0)
is referred to as the head, and the right part (P1, ..., Pn) is
referred as the body.
Facts are clauses without a body; they are used to specify
attacker and system states. For instance, the attacker’s goal and
initial location, host and network configuration, and existing
vulnerabilities. While facts can be derived automatically using
tools, such as Nmap, Nessus, and OpenVAS, designing and
creating new interaction rules is not a challenging task which
is performed manually using security experts.
In order to execute a Datalog program, MulVAL uses the
XSB environment, which is an extended implementation of
the Prolog programming language that supports tabled execu-
tion. Tabled execution prevents the recalculation of previously
calculated facts (i.e., each fact is calculated only once). Since
the number of facts is polynomial in the size of the network,
executing a Datalog program has polynomial time complexity.
B. Algorithm for automatic rule generation
The process of automatically generating MulVAL’s interac-
tion rules consists of three main phases (phase 4 in Figure 2):
structure creation (phase 4a), constant argument assignment
(phase 4b), and variable wiring (phase 4c).
Structure creation. In this phase, we create the structure of
the interaction rule, given the entities and values extracted
for the security vulnerability. As mentioned, the structure of
an interaction rule includes a head and a body. The head
represents the impact of the attack, and the body represents
the list of preconditions required by an attacker to achieve this
impact.
In order to derive the structure of the interaction rule, we
utilize three attack entities: attack impact, attack mean, and at-
tack vector. Based on the output of the attack entity extraction
algorithm (Section IV), we identify (within the vulnerability
description) the entities that specify the impact and mean of
the attack, as well as the context in which attack exploitation
is possible (i.e., the attack vector). In a case in which some
of the entities are missing, we apply the logistic regression
model for completing missing information (Section V). Note
that if this information cannot be completed by the algorithm,
the rule cannot be created.
After determining the text that is relevant to each of those
attack entities, we apply the relevant k-means clustering model
to map the free text values into predicates. The predicate
that specifies the impact of the attack defines the head of
the interaction rule, and the predicates that specify the attack
vector and attack mean specify the body of the interaction rule
(see phase 4a in Figure 2).
Constant argument assignment. As mentioned, interaction
rules support two types of arguments: constant and variable
arguments. After defining the structure of the interaction
rule, we assign values to the constant arguments. This is
done based on the extracted attack entities (see phase 4b in
Figure 2). We map each constant argument to the relevant
attack entities and use the information extracted from the
vulnerability description to set this argument.
Variable wiring. Predicates may include large sets of vari-
ables. In contrast to constant arguments, which are bound
when formulating the predicate, the binding of a variable
is performed during the pattern matching process used by
the Datalog interpreter. However, when formulating a new
interaction rule, there is a need to correctly wire the variables
across the different predicates of the interaction rule. Wiring
two variables is performed by assigning them the same name.
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For instance, in the example presented in Figure 2 (phase
4c), we can identify multiple variables that specify a host
(e.g., Principal, Host, SrcHost, DstHost). However, in some
predicates this host represents the vulnerable host (such as in
the networkService predicate), and in other predicates this host
represents the attacker host (such as in the attackerLocated
predicate). Furthermore, there are predicates for which both
the attacker host and target host should be specified (such as
in execCode and netAcsess).
It should be mentioned that wiring the variable correctly is
crucial for producing an interaction rule that is semantically
correct. In this phase, we utilize an algorithm that can be used
to automatically wire the variables of new interaction rules.
We use a probability matrix that represents the probability for
two variables to be wired. This probability is calculated based
on the wiring observed in existing interaction rules.
Formally, the probability matrix M ∈ Rn×n is a symmetric
matrix that represents all of the variables that exist in the initial
rule set. The value M [i, j] represents the probability for wiring
the ith and jth variables, given that they exist in the same
interaction rule. This probability can be estimated by dividing
the number of times these two variables were wired by the
number of times these two variable appeared together in the
same interaction rule.
Using the probability matrix, we can estimate the probability
for wiring two variables. However, since many variables never
appear together in the same interaction rule, this matrix in-
cludes unknown values. In order to solve this problem, we used
a k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) imputer model. Specifically,
when facing an unknown value, we complete that value with
the average across the K closest vectors in the matrix.
C. Evaluation
Experimental setup. We conducted two different experi-
ments. The first experiment focused on evaluating the variable
wiring model. The dataset used for this experiment is based
on the extended attack graph modeling presented in [44].
This dataset includes 199 interaction rules. The model was
trained/tested using a 10-fold cross-validation setup.
The second experiment focused on evaluating the entire
framework (end-to-end evaluation). The dataset used for this
experiment includes 27K randomly selected vulnerabilities
from the NVD.
All of the experiments were performed on a 64-bit Windows
Server 2008 R2 Enterprise machine, with a 2.00 GHZ Intel
Xeon CPU (version E5-2620 with 24 logical cores) and 64
GB of RAM. The variable wiring algorithm was implemented
in Python using the sklearn library.
Evaluation measures. In the first experiment, we used the
average F-score [47] as a measure for the accuracy of the
models.
In the second experiment, we used the success ratio as a
measure for the accuracy of the model. We define the success
ratio as the portion of vulnerability descriptions for which our
proposed framework was able to derive interaction rules.
In addition to the success ratio, we manually validated 50
randomly selected rules.
Results. The results in the first experiment – evaluation of
the variable wiring model – are promising, with an average
F1-score of 0.84 (and an average accuracy of 0.97).
In the end-to-end experiment, the framework was able to
automatically generate interaction rules for 19.5K of the 27K
vulnerabilities that were processed (i.e., a success ratio of
72%). When analyzing the vulnerabilities that could not be
modeled by the framework, we observed that the main reason
for the framework’s inability to generate a rule is missing
values for the attack mean and attack impact entities. In
addition, for about 1,300 of the vulnerabilities that could not
be processed, the attack mean was described as an ‘unspecified
vulnerability.’
Our manual assessment of the 50 randomly selected rules
indicates that 36 out of the 50 rules were created correctly
(72%). The main errors identified in the incorrectly generated
rules are: missclassification of the impact or mean of the attack
by the attack entity extraction algorithm (seven rules); incor-
rectly wiring the variables of the predicates by the variable
wiring algorithm (three rules); and a missing impact that was
completed incorrectly by the completing missing information
algorithm (four rules). Examples of these errors are presented
in Figure 10.
Generated Interaction Rule:
execCode(Principal, Host, root):-
malicious(Principal)
attackerLocated(Host)
vulHost(Host, CVE-1999-0032, lpr, _ , BSD, local, execcode)
localAccess(Principal, Host, User)
localService(Host, BSD, root)
CVE-1999-0032:
Buffer overflow  in lpr, as used in BSD-based systems including Linux, allows 
local users  to execute arbitrary code  as  root  via a long -C (classification) 
command line option.
Example 1: Error in the variable wiring algorithm
ERROR
(a) The attackerLocated predicate specifies the host of the attacker,
which represented using the Principal variable.
Generated Interaction Rule:
accessFile(AttackerHost,Host ,Access,Path) :-
malicious(AttackerHost)
attackerLocated(AttackerHost)
vulHost(Host,CVE-1999-0006,POP servers, _, BSD remote,fileAccess)
hasAccount(AttackerHost, Host, User)
netAccess(AttackerHost, Host, Protocol, Port)
CVE-1999-0006:
Buffer overflow in POP servers based on BSD/Qualcomm's qpopper allows 
remote attackers to gain root access using a long PASS command.
Example 2: Error in the attack entity extraction algorithm
ERROR
(b) The attack entity extraction algorithm misclassified the impact of
that attack as access instead of gain root access. Following that, the
class discretization algorithm mapped this value to Access Data
.
Figure 10: Examples of errors made by the automatic gener-
ation of interaction rules.
12
VII. RELATED WORK
Previous studies related to our research have focused mainly
on the first challenge – extracting cybersecurity information
from text.
In the domain of entity extraction, previous works utilized
different data sources; the most commonly used is the
NVD [2], [48], [33], [8], [14], [23]. The national vulnerability
database (NVD) is a database that contains common
vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs). The information
provided for each vulnerability within the NVD includes its
description, references (list of URLs), date of entry creation,
etc.
Another commonly used dataset is the Metasploit
database [23], [8], [14]. The Metasploit project is an
open-source project that serves as a public resource for
researching security vulnerabilities and developing code. For
each exploit the Metasploit database includes the description,
CVE-ID (if it exists), score, references (list of URLs), etc.
Other common data sources are security blogs [23], [48], [31],
antivirus websites [23], APT reports [25], CTI reports [20],
and vulnerability datasets of specific companies, such as
Microsoft [48], [8], [14] and Adobe [48].
Various methods have being proposed for
extracting cybersecurity-related information from semi-
structured/unstructured datasets. The most simple and naive
method is a rule-based approach [18], [48], [2]. In this
approach, all of the rules are manually defined, and therefore
this approach cannot scale. In the proposed framework,
we utilize an unsupervised machine learning approach, and
therefore our framework does not rely on the manual efforts
of security experts.
Classic machine learning models (e.g., CRF, SVM, and
HMM) were also used for identifying attack entities’ val-
ues [2], [8], [48], [19]. These models rely on handcrafted (e.g.,
orthographic) features that are defined manually by security
experts. In addition, these methods can only process a single
data point (i.e., word) and are unable to capture the entire
sequence (i.e., a sentence); therefore, they cannot be used to
capture long-term dependencies.
With the emerging use of deep neural networks (DNNs) in
the NLP domain, analyzing cybersecurity-related text using
NLP techniques became popular [25], [40], [20], [15]. Previ-
ous research used word embeddings [40], [15], [25] or char-
acter embeddings [25] as the feature for representing entities.
These works utilized pretrained embedding methods that were
trained on general English datasets. Since the cybersecurity
domain includes specific terminology and linguistic semantics
which are different from general English repositories, these
methods are less accurate than our proposed method which is
trained on the NVD dataset. Mulwad et al. [33] used Open-
Calais and Wikitology, which are general (not cybersecurity-
related) tools for named entity recognition. An analysis of
the results obtained by these tools when they are applied on
cybersecurity-related texts with a set of manually defined rules,
shows that they are able to identify the security-related entities
within the text. While this method utilized existing NLP tools,
it still requires a human expert to define the rules for post-
processing.
Unlike general NLP tasks, in the domain of cybersecurity,
there is no predefined set of entities to predict that is com-
monly used in all studies in this area. For example, while the
authors of [23] and [48] extracted six types of entities that
describe attacks, the authors of [2] focused on extracting the
privilege entity of attacks (i.e., the privileges required for the
attack to be successful), Bridges et al. [8] focused on entities
that are related to the the attacker action, and Mulwad et
al. [33] focused on the vulnerability type. In this work, since
we are aiming to derive the interaction rules that model the
attacks, we extract a comprehensive set of 11 different types
of entities.
We summarize and compare the prior work mentioned
above in Table II in the Appendix.
While almost all of the studies presenting methods to extract
cybersecurity entities from textual sources motivated their
research with the need to model attacks [18], [2], only two
of them presented methods for achieving this goal [15], [33].
In [18], the authors derived a model for generating MulVAL
interaction rules, however this model has two main limitations.
First the CVE’s vulnerability type is known prior to the entity
extraction. In our work, the model doesn’t need to know the
vulnerability type in advance in order to generate the right
rule. Second, the authors did not mention how to wire the
variables across the different predicates.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to present
an end-to-end fully automated process for deriving interaction
rules from textual descriptions of security vulnerabilities, as
well as the first to propose methods for completing missing
attack information.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We present a novel, end-to-end, automated framework for
modeling new attack techniques from textual description of a
security vulnerability. The proposed framework implements a
novel pipeline that includes a dedicated cybersecurity linguis-
tic model trained on the the NVD repository, a recurrent neural
network model used for attack entity extraction, a logistic
regression model used for completing the missing information,
and a novel machine learning-based approach for automati-
cally modeling the attacks as MulVAL’s interaction rule. We
evaluated the performance of each of the individual algorithms,
as well as of the complete framework and demonstrated its
effectiveness.
In future work we plan to evaluate the impact of the
new attack interaction rules on the attack graphs derived
for different organization networks (both in terms of run
time and new attack paths). In addition, we plan to extend
our cybersecurity linguistic model to other cybersecurity data
sources such as security blogs, CTI reports, etc. Finally, since
some of the rules were created with errors, we plan to develop
and provide a confidence score for each rule created that will
indicate the level of assurance in the correctness of the rule.
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[25]
APT reports and
alienvault’ blogs
with the mode
BIO
Word
embedding +
Char embedding
BiLSTM + self
attention NO NO 8 4 8 8 8 4 8 8 8 8 8 0.86 0.83 0.84
[40]
From [8], CVE’s
descriptions
from NVD
Word
embedding
GRU + CNN +
CRF NO NO 8 4 8 8 4 4 8 8 8 8 8 0.9 0.96 0.93
[20]
160 CTI reports
(PDF files)
BOC character-
level feature rep-
resentation (pre-
trained Glove)+
hand crafted fea-
tures
Bi-LSTM - CRF NO NO 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 0.79
[15]
corpora of
Bridges et al
Word
embedding Bi-LSTM - CRF NO
ontology using
the SWRL
language
8 4 4 8 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 0.84 0.77 0.79
[18]
540 CVEs de-
scriptions (cho-
sen by vulnera-
bility type)
Rule-Base, by
punctuation and
keywords
NO
Modeling to
MuLVAl 8 4 4 8 8 8 4 4 8 4 8 0.88
[23]
30 security
blogs, 240 CVE
descriptions
and 80 official
security bulletins
from Microsoft
and Adobe
hand crafted fea-
tures
CRF (Stanford
NER) No NO 4 4 4 4 4 4 8 8 8 8 8 0.76 0.83 0.8
[48]
210 vulnerabil-
ity descriptions
from NVD
hand crafted fea-
tures
CRF (Stanford
NER) NO NO 4 4 4 8 4 8 4 8 8 8 8 0.54 0.58 0.55
[48]
210 vulnerabil-
ity descriptions
from NVD
Part-Of-Speech Rule-Base NO NO 4 4 4 8 4 8 4 8 8 8 8 0.73 0.82 0.71
[8]
vulnerability de-
scriptions from
NVD
hand crafted fea-
tures
Maximum
Entropy Model NO NO 8 4 8 8 4 4 8 8 8 8 8 0.98 0.99 0.99
[33]
107 vulnerabil-
ity descriptions
from NVD
OpenCalais and
Wikitology NO
Semantic Web
language OWL 8 4 8 8 8 8 4 8 8 8 8 0.9
[2]
550 vulnerabil-
ity descriptions
from NVD
taxonomy-based
Rule-Based vs.
RBF Networks
vs. SVM vs.
NEAT vs. MPL
NO
talk about attack
graph but don’t
talk about a
method for
modeling
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 4 8 8 8 0.96
[19]
62 news articles,
blogs, and up-
dates
boot - strapping NO NO 8 4 8 8 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 0.8 0.24
Our
Work
650 CVEs
desciptions from
NVD
Word-
Embeddings B-LSTM YES
Modeling to
MulVAL 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0.88 0.78 0.84
Table II: Summary of related works for attack entities extraction.
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